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INTRODUCTION
Urban property reform is an issue of current importance in many
developing countries. Among policymakers, property titling is
increasingly considered an effective form of government interven-
tion for targeting the poor and encouraging economic growth in
urban areas.2 While there exists a wide body of literature demon-
strating the positive influence of property institutions on market
outcomes, there is little microeconomic evidence documenting the
cost of informality to individual households. This Article contributes
to the literature by examining the time costs of informal tenure
arrangements in squatter communities. A number of authors have
noted that, in many settings, informal institutions arise to compen-
sate for the absence of formal property protection.' In such settings,
one of the principal gains of strong property institutions is to shift
the burden of property protection and enforcement away from
individual households and informal communities to the state.4
Hence, an important outcome of titling efforts that effectively
increase household tenure security should be to allow households
and communities to reallocate time away from this role.
To explore the relationship between institutional reform and
household-level resource allocation, this Article examines whether
improvements in tenure security that result from giving property
titles to urban squatters in Peru influence the time allocation of
2. See Binswanger et al., Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land
Relations, in 3B HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONoMIcs 265a, 2719-23 (Jere Behrman &
T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1995); Deniz Baharoglu, The World Bank, World Bank Experience in
Land Management and The Debate on Tenure Security 5-19 (July 2002) (unpublished draft
report), available at httpJIvww.worldbank.org/urban/publicatland final.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Michael Carter & Keith Wiebe, Tenure Security for Whom?An Econometric
Analysis of the Differential Impact of Land Titling Programs in Kenya, in SEARCHING FOR
LAND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA (John W. Bruce & Shem E. Migot-Adholla eds., 1994);
MICHAEL R. CARTER & PEDRO OLINTO, GETrING INSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT" FOR WHOM: CREDIT
CONSTRAINTS AND THE IMPACT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE QUANTITY AND COMPOSITION OF
INVESTMENT (Univ. of Wis.-Madison, Dep't of Agric. & Applied Econ., Staff Paper Series No.
433, 2000); AHMED GALAL & OMAR RAZZAZ, REFORMING LAND AND REAL ESTATE MARKETS
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 2616, 2001).
4. See generally Lucy Conger, Entitled to Prosperity, URB. AGE MAG., Fall 1999, at 7
(describing the necessity of keeping watch over untitled property versus the relative security
resulting from formal title).
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household members across labor and leisure activities inside and
outside the home. In particular, this Article explores whether
receiving a legal property title reduces the likelihood that house-
holds will keep individuals at home and inside the community to
protect property, thus leading these individuals to increase employ-
ment and leisure hours outside the home. The idea underlying these
predictions is that, in the absence of formal legal property protec-
tion, households and informal communities have an incentive to
provide their own human resources for residential security, and
thus, to consider the need to stay at home or close to home when
making time allocation choices.
Hence, this Article also examines whether strengthening property
institutions encourages households to relocate entrepreneurial
activity from inside to outside the home. Finally, because property
formalization presumably shifts the burden of land protection from
individual communities to the state, this Article examines whether
titling is also associated with a reduction in the level of land-related
neighborhood governance and an increase in the role of formal law
enforcement at the neighborhood level.
This Article examines these relationships using data from a
dramatic nationwide titling program in Peru (Program), in which
1.2 million property titles were distributed to urban squatters on
public land, the largest urban property rights reform that has
occurred in the developing world.5 The empirical strategy employed
in this study takes advantage of the Program as a natural experi-
ment by making use of staggered regional program timing. A
general difficulty in studying the influence of property titles and a
weakness inherent in the past literature is concerned over
endogeneity that arises in comparing titled and untitled households.
In particular, the tenure status of a given household is generally a
function of the household demand for legal protection, which is
likely to be related to factors affecting household and community
time allocation choices. The Peruvian reform, in which all house-
5. WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION & ECON. MGMT. UNIT, PROJECT APPRAISAL
DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF U.S. $38 MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE
REPUBLIC OF PERU FOR A PROPERTY RIGHTS PROJECT, No. 18245 PE, at 24 (1998), available
at httpJ/www-wds.worldbank.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter PERU PROJECT
APPPiAsAL DOCUMENT].
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holds were "assigned" property titles irrespective of household
demand for formalization, helps to isolate the causal effect of
property titling on household behavior by enabling a comparison of
households in early program neighborhoods to households in late
program neighborhoods, all of which lie within the set of eventual
program participants. Because it is impossible to completely rule
out potential endogeneity of program timing, the second technique
of the identification strategy is to make use of a comparison group
of households in early and late neighborhoods that already pos-
sessed a property title before the existence of the Program. Hence,
I estimate the program effect in a difference-in-difference frame-
work, in which the difference in the behavior of program beneficia-
ries and non-beneficiaries in early program areas is compared to the
difference in late program areas.
While there is a large body of research examining the influence
of property titles on market outcomes, the influence of property
titles, as outlined in the existing literature, has focused almost
entirely on three outcomes established in a seminal paper by
Timothy Besley: gains from trade in land, greater investment
incentives, and improved credit access.6 Among these, a leading
motivation for property reforms is the notion that strengthening
ownership rights will encourage lenders to use property as collateral
in loan transactions.7 Peruvian economist and urban property
reform advocate Hernando de Soto states:
In the midst of their own poorest neighborhoods and shanty
towns ... there are trillions of dollars, all ready to be put to use....
[Yet] because the rights to these possessions are not adequately
documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital,
cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where people
know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a
loan, and cannot be used as a share against an investment.
6. See Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence
from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903, 903-12 (1995).
7. See id. at 908-10.
8. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 37 (2000).
840 [Vol. 45:837
PROPERTY RIGHTS
For this reason, government land titling programs are widely
considered a critical instrument for increasing access to credit
among the poor.9 Empirical estimates of the collateral value of
property titles in agricultural settings also corroborate the predic-
tions of the Besley model, with respect to both credit supply and
agricultural investment demand.10
Meanwhile, the relationship between institutional reform and
household time allocation has been absent from empirical studies of
property rights. This is likely due to the fact that the past literature
largely has been confined to agricultural settings, while decisions
related to spending time outside the community or away from
residential property are most relevant to urban households. This
Article complements the existing literature by considering one of the
unique welfare implications of urban property titling efforts.
This Article's findings suggest that land titling is indeed associ-
ated with substantial changes in household and community time
use patterns. In particular, formal property ownership is associated
with a significant reduction in the amount of time household
members spend inside the home, including a 48% decrease in the
fraction of households that locate entrepreneurial activities inside
the home and a 36% reduction in the fraction of households that
9. See Klaus Deininger & Hans Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Bank's Land
Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 247,
259-62 (1999) (recognizing that "[i]mproved credit access has repeatedly been shown to be one
of the major benefits from formal title"); see also Gershon Feder & David Feeny, Land Tenure
and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy, 5 WORLD BANK ECON.
REV. 135 (1991) (claiming that "the most commonly recognized benefit from legal titling of
land is the use of those secure ownership rights as collateral to solicit credit").
10. For studies that link land titles with improved credit access, see LEE J. ALSTON ETAL.,
THE DETERMiNANTS AND IMPACT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: LAND TITLES ON THE BRAZILIAN
FRONTIER 8, 23-24 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5405, 1996); CARTER
& OLINTO, supra note 3; RAMON E. LOPEZ & CLAUDIA ROMANO, RURAL POVERTY IN HONDURAS:
ASSET DISTRIBUTION AND LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS (Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, Dep't of Agric.
& Resource Econ., 1995). See, e.g., Abhijit V. Baneijee et al., Empowerment and Efficiency:
Tenancy Reform in West Bengal, 110 J. POL. ECON. 239, 240-41, 253-55 (2002); Besley, supra
note 6, at 908-36; AL& MN ET AL., supra, at 18-34; KLAUS W. DEININGER & GERSHON FEDER,
LAND INSTITUTIONS AND LAND MARKETS (World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2014, 1998). But see Shem Migot-Adnoua et al., Indigenous Land Rights
Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV.
155 (1991); T.C. Pinckney & P. Kimuyu, Land Tenure Reform in East Africa: Good, Bad or
Unimportant?, 3 J. AFR. ECON. 1 (1994) (determining that land titling has little impact on
investments).
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report keeping individuals at home to protect property." In a
parallel fashion, urban land titling is also associated with a greater
number of both labor and leisure hours spent outside the home:
newly titled households work an average of 17% more hours than do
squatter households awaiting a title, and are also 38% more likely
to participate in organized activities outside the home. 2 Finally,
although household members in titled communities spend a greater
number of total leisure hours in activities outside the home, they
are significantly less likely to participate in the neighborhood
groups responsible for public goods provision, including property
allocation and protection, in informal communities.'" Meanwhile,
the number of households that have used the formal judicial system
is significantly higher in titled communities.' 4 All of these results
suggest that households in titled communities indeed devote fewer
human resources to informal property protection, both at the
household and community levels.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK i1
There are three principal mechanisms by which it is assumed
that individuals in informal communities devote time to increasing
tenure security. First, untitled households can provide informal
policing either by guarding individual properties or by participating
in community enforcement efforts to protect neighborhood bound-
aries and individual properties from other squatters. 6 If prospective
squatters seek out abandoned land, signaling that the property is
occupied may deter conflicts over land or property boundaries. As
the following quote illustrates, ample anecdotal evidence suggests
that urban squatters are commonly constrained by the need to keep
a family member at or close to home to protect against residential
property invasion: "'I go to work, and my mother looks after the
11. See infra Tables 4, 5a.
12. See infra Tables 6, 7.
13. See infra Table 8.
14. See infra Table 9.
15. The next three sections borrow extensively from FIELD, supra note 1.
16. In a related sense, it is reasonable to assume that untitled households face a greater
threat from burglary, given that it is more costly for those dwelling in untitled households to
contact local law enforcement. It is also reasonable to assume that households that do not
have legal rights to a residence have less legal claim to property inside the home.
[Vol. 45:837842
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house,' says Alejandrina Matos Franco, who sells cassettes on the
street in Lima and who worries that people could seize her house
when she is away.""
Second, reducing the probability of government eviction at the
community level may require a critical mass of individuals squat-
ting on neighborhood land, particularly in early stages of commu-
nity formation. Finally, households may attempt to increase tenure
security through formal channels by completing administrative
steps to acquire land rights. In Peru, as in many developing
countries, the legal process of acquiring formal property titles
traditionally involved substantial monetary and time costs.
According to one report, "in Peru, ... getting a deed involved 207
bureaucratic steps, divided among 48 government offices, [and] took
[an average ofl 43 months [to complete].""8
As long as untitled households expend their own human resources
in an effort to solidify informal claims to land through any of these
activities related to private property protection and community
enforcement, the acquisition of a property title has direct value in
terms of freeing up hours of work previously devoted to maintaining
tenure security through informal means. The influence of such
changes in tenure security on household time allocation can be
captured in a simple variation of the basic agricultural household
model, in which labor hours of household members are divided
between work at home (H,) and work in the outside market (H0o),
and time spent at home (Z) is divided between work at home (H,)
and leisure (L).19 In addition, the extended model incorporates a
tenure security function, s(), into the household utility function,
such that home security is determined by total hours of household
17. Conger, supra note 4, at 7-10.
18. A Matter of Title, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 47.
19. Here, N is the number of household members, and 1, is leisure, x, consumption, h,,
labor hours in home production, and h,, outside labor hours of household member i, and
N N N N
L=yj, =hfl 0  X==, =l-, Z=H,+L
i=1 -A H i-4 N N
The value of labor at home is given by the production function q(Hf), while the value of work
outside the home is the market wage w. For formal presentation of the model, including
details of the comparative statics, see FIELD, supra note 1.
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time at home (time spent by individuals protecting property), an
exogenous parameter, 6, which reflects the household's level of
formal property rights, and a summary measure, i , which reflects
the degree of informal or "de facto" rights the household has
acquired. The parameter 6 can be thought of either as a binary
indicator of a legally registered property title, or as a more nuanced
parameter which reflects the level of formal legal recognition of a
household's tenure status (e.g., level of efficiency of court systems,
level of police cooperation, etc.). In this framework, hours spent
inside the community, which include both leisure and home
production time, enter household utility through their effect on
home security, in addition to their respective consumption and
production values. Hence, household utility is an increasing function
of per capita leisure, consumption, and home security:
U(X,[,s;Vz,E), where s = s(Z,6,z).
The implications of the household's ability to increase tenure
security through informal mechanisms for the optimal allocations
of labor and leisure can be derived by maximizing the above utility
function, where the choice variables for the household are: Hf, Ho,
X, L and s. The constraints to the maximization problem are:
s=s(Hf +L6,z)
pX = wH, + q(H)
T=L+Ho+H,
4Ho,HfX >O
Substituting the constraints into the utility function and taking
the total derivatives of the first-order conditions yields the following
inequalities for values of w, 6, and z
alf <0 and 1H. >0
a6 a6
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These conditions imply that, in the aggregate, strengthening
formal property rights decreases work hours inside the community
and increases time spent working outside.2 ° Intuitively, this reflects
the fact that an exogenous increase in the level of formal property
rights corresponds to a decrease in the household's need to spend
time on home protection, thereby lowering the opportunity cost of
outside labor force hours.2' In addition, two auxiliary implications
follow from this model. First, the effect of a change in formal
property rights on labor supply is decreasing in the household's level
of informal property rights, r
j2Hf* > 0 and a2 < 0
Second, given average consumption level x, the effects are decreas-
ing in the number of working-age household members, N.
a2Ha
>0 and ___<
a6aN diWN
The intuition behind the family size effect is that, the more family
members living in a household, the more likely it is that someone
chooses to stay at home independent of security considerations.
Thus, large households are less distorted by the need to keep watch
over the residence.22 These predictions will motivate me to test
empirically whether the effect of acquiring a formal property title on
labor supply differentially impacts households of different sizes and
with different lengths of residential tenure.
The model can be extended to incorporate differences in the
household supply of adult and child labor when only adults contrib-
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id.
22. See id. Consistent with these implications, Lanjouw and Levy find that levels of
informal tenure security in urban communities in Ecuador vary systematically with
observable household characteristics such as sex of household head and length of residence.
Jean 0. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property Rights
in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 993 tbl.3 (2002).
20041 845
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ute to security provision. This extension formalizes the intuitive
idea that, if adults have a comparative advantage in the provision
of home security, in the absence of secure property rights, children
will substitute for adults in the labor market. In this case, while
total household labor hours rise with an increase in formal rights,
child labor hours will actually fall. Adult comparative advantage is
particularly likely when security is provided through neighborhood
organizations.
II. PROJECT BACKGROUND
Peru's informal urban settlements grew out of the massive urban-
rural migration that occurred over the last half century as a result
of the collapse of the rural economy (due in part to a failed land
reform program) and the growth of terrorism.23 The existence of
extensive barren land owned by the state on the perimeters of major
cities, along with an implicit housing policy during the 1980s that
allowed squatter settlements on unused government lands, led to an
extended era of urban migration, often in the form of organized
invasions by squatters from the same area of emigration.2 It is
estimated that in 1997, a quarter of Peru's urban population lived
in marginal squatter settlements in peri-urban areas and many
more untitled residents occupied inner-city neighborhoods.25
Prior to the reforms, obtaining a property title for a Peruvian
household was nearly impossible due to heavy bureaucratic
procedures and prohibitive fees.26 As described in the initial project
report, "Peru's traditional system of titling and registration is
complex, inefficient, expensive-prohibitively so for poorer people
-and prone to rent-seeking. Fourteen different agencies are
23. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 5.
24. See Ingrid G. Ol6rtegui, Informal Settlers in Lima, in COPING WITH INFORMALITYAND
ILLEGALITY IN HuMAN SETTLEMENTS IN DEVELOPING CITIES 3 (ESF/N-AERUS Intl Workshop,
Leuven and Brussels, Belgium, May 23-26, 2001), available at http'//www.brookes.ac.uk/
schools/planning/dates/naerus/workshop200l/papers/olortegui.pdf(last visited Feb. 11,2004).
Invasion of privately owned property was allowed by law if the land had been unused for a
period of four years. The law has since changed (in 1990) to prohibit invasions of private
property under any circumstance. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 6 n.7.
25. World Bank, Urban Property Rights Project, Social Context, Annex Al (1997) (World
Bank Internal Paper, Washington, D.C.). For a country map of the untitled population and
properties targeted for formalization, see infra Appendix 2.
26. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 6.
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involved in the generation of each title, the courts have rarely been
able to validate these titles as the law requires .... Due to acute
housing shortages and the absence of legal transparency, tenants
struggled not only with the government but also among themselves
to secure residential properties. 28 The common failure of the
government to defend or even recognize informal tenure rights in
individual disputes gave rise to rent-seeking behavior in the form of
invasions of untitled land.29
In 1991, a Peruvian non-governmental organization embarked on
an innovative property titling project in the capital city of Lima
whose goal was "the rapid conversion of informally owned property
to securely delineated property rights" by the issuing and register-
ing of property titles.3 ° Between 1992 and 1995, roughly 200,000
titles were issued at an extremely low cost, convincing the govern-
ment and a growing international audience of the potential for
efficiency gains from urban property formalization.3' In 1996, under
the auspices of the public agency COFOPRI (Committee for the
Formalization of Private Property) and Decree 803: Law Promoting
Access to Formal Propery,2 the Peruvian government established a
national property registry based on the early model to formalize the
remaining properties in Lima and extend the program to seven
other cities.
33
Just as in the pilot project, implementation of the national
Program involved area-wide titling by neighborhood, which was
27. Peru-Urban Property Rights Project, World Bank Report No. PID6523, at 1 (July
1998). In his groundbreaking study of the underground economy, economist Hernando de Soto
documented the same phenomenon: "In 'The Other Path', [de Soto and aides concluded that]
... to get title to a house in an informal settlement whose permanence the government had
already acknowledged took 728 steps for one agency alone, and 10 other agencies also
required approvals." Tina Rosenberg, Editorial, Looking at Poverty, Seeing Untapped Riches,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 2000, at A34.
28. See Ol6rtegui, supra note 24, at 1.
29. PERU PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 7.
30. See id. at 2 (stating that over 150,000 properties were registered by 1993).
31. See id.
32. See COFOPRI Office, Decreee 803: Ley de Promoci~n del Acceso a la Propiedad
Formal, available at httpJAvww.comunidad.derecho.org/regisperu/cofopri.html [hereinafter
COFOPRI]. For specific legislation of COFOPRI, see infra Appendix 4.
33. Target cities were chosen according to a formula based on city size, density of informal
settlements, and distance from commercial centers, measures indicating the likely ease and
cost of formalization and the expected poverty impact. PERU PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT,
supra note 5, at 3.
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"presumed to foster, through community participation and
education, a demand for formalization, reduce the unit cost of
formalization, and rapidly generate a minimum critical mass of
beneficiaries."34 While the old process of acquiring a formal property
title was prohibitively slow and expensive, the new process was free
and extremely rapid.a Once a local property registration system was
set up, local program officials were trained, and the city's target
areas were properly identified and mapped, several project teams
simultaneously entered neighborhoods starting from different points
in the city.36 To be eligible for program participation, title claimants
were required to verify residency predating 1995, and to live on
eligible public properties.37 As a result of the reforms, by December
2001 nearly 1.2 million of the country's previously unregistered
residents became nationally registered property owners, affecting
approximately 6.3 million of the roughly 10 million untitled
residents living in the range from just above to below the poverty
line.38
In the realm of literature on the economic benefits of tenure
security, the Peruvian experience provides a unique research
opportunity for many reasons. The national formalization plan
constitutes a one-of-a-kind natural experiment worldwide in terms
34. World Bank, Urban Property Rights Project, Socio-Economic Assessment, Annex A3
(1997) (World Bank Internal Paper).
35. FIELD, supra note 1, at 6.
36. In campaigns oftwo months each, project teams entered fifty to seventy neighborhoods
encompassing roughly 30,000 to 35,000 plots. Within a neighborhood, teams spent five to
seven weeks establishing residential claims and delineating properties before conferring
state-registered property titles onto all eligible residents. The registration process for these
titles took an additional period of one to six months. Id. at 7 n.1l.
37. Ineligible properties included archaeological sites and flood plains, among other
exceptions. See description infra note 47. In the COFOPRI data, 9.42% of sampled households
are ineligible according to reported length of residence, and an additional 10% remain untitled
after several years of program operation. See COFOPRI, supra note 32.
38. Even before the end of the grant period in December 2002, 1.64 million lots had
already been formalized and 1.21 million titles granted, the vast majority of which took place
between 1998 and 2000. FIELD, supra note 1, at 7 n.13; see also PERU PROJECT APPRAISAL
DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 19. While no residents who previously possessed registered
municipal titles are included in this figure, it is uncertain what fraction of this number had
locally registered sales documents before the national reforms as these households were
included in the government's definition of "untitled," though in reality the Program simply
transferred such titles to the national registry. In this Article, the term "squatter" refers only
to households with no sales or judicial titles prior to the reforms, which is estimated to be 37%
of the target population. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 7 n.13.
[Vol. 45:837848
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of providing nearly cost-free improvements in ownership security on
such a large scale.39 Unlike many large-scale government programs,
the titling efforts took place at an extremely rapid pace, which
facilitates program evaluation by eliminating much of the need to
consider time trends that could obscure the independent effects of
program participation. 4' At the same time, in the absence of panel
data on participating households, the fact that program timing was
staggered proves to be an asset for evaluation purposes. A survey of
2750 urban households was conducted in March 2000 midway
through program implementation. 41 Because the sample was drawn
from the universe of all target populations for eventual program
intervention, the data contain a number of households in neighbor-
hoods in which the Program has not yet entered.42
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
My empirical analysis of household responses to changes in
formal property rights relies on the COFOPRI baseline survey data.
The data consist of 2750 households sampled from the universe of
all residences in non-incorporated urban and peri-urban settlements
identified in the 1993 census of the eight cities targeted by the
titling program.43 The survey was stratified by city, with cluster
units often households randomly sampled at the neighborhood level
within cities.4 The survey instrument contains a wide variety of
information on household and individual characteristics in addition
to five modules designed specifically to collect information on the
range of economic and social benefits associated with property
formalization.45
To identify the impact of receiving a property title on time use,
the study exploits variation in the year in which the COFOPRI
program entered a neighborhood to compare households in program
neighborhoods that already have been reached by the survey date
39. FIELD, supra note 1, at 7.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See COFOPRI, supra note 32.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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to households in late program neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are
classified as having been reached by the time of the survey if more
than one household in the cluster reports owning a COFOPRI title.4"
Clusters in which no household or only one household has a
COFOPRI title are assumed to be those in which the program has
not entered, although it is generally impossible to separate the
neighborhoods in which the program will never enter from those
which will be treated eventually. Nonetheless, such neighborhoods
share the key feature of no expected program effect."7 Since the
households in the treated neighborhoods may or may not actually
have received a government title by the time of the survey, this
Article employs an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis."
The effect of the program is presumed to increase over time on
account of the growing fraction of titled households within a treated
neighborhood and because household behavioral adjustments or
confidence in the value of a COFOPRI title may exhibit a lagged
response. For this purpose, year of program entry was defined as the
earliest reported COFOPRI title year within the cluster.49 Dynamic
response was restricted to be linear in four time periods: January
1999 to June 2000, January 1997 to December 1998, January 1995
to December 1996, and January 1992 to December 1994.' 0 This
division corresponds to three major waves of the Program's expan-
sion: From 1992 to 1995, 200,000 titles were granted by the
Institute of Liberty and Democracy as part of a pilot project prior to
COFOPRI; the first wave of COFOPRI titles was initiated in 1995
46. The survey data do not directly identify program neighborhoods, nor can this variable
currently be constructed by matching geographic identifiers to COFOPRI office data.
47. Reasons that households may be excluded include: the household cannot prove
residence prior to 1995; the household belongs to a cooperative association; the residence lies
on an archaeological site, flood plain, mining site, or private property; and ambiguous or
disputed ownership claims. Unfortunately, none of the above information is collected in the
survey. According to anecdotal evidence from program administrators, disputed claims within
families or between neighbors are the most common reason that title distribution is delayed
for an untitled household in a treated neighborhood. Interview with Carlos Gandolfo, Program
administrator, in Lima, Peru (Aug. 9, 2000).
48. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 15.
49. Due to the fact that not all households were given property titles right away and
because of measurement error in title year reporting, households in the same cluster who had
received a COFOPRI title did not necessarily report the same title year. When the minimum
reported title year fell below the first regional title year according to program data, the second
lowest title year was assigned to the cluster.
50. FIELD, supra note 1, at 15.
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in Lima and Arequipa; and beginning in 1997, the Program
expanded into six other cities.5 Furthermore, these intervals were
consistent with the observed relationship between subjective
statements on tenure security and years since program entry.
Although target areas for wide-scale economic development
programs are never randomly selected, these data have the
advantage that all sample members live in areas that eventually
will be targeted for program intervention, increasing confidence in
the comparability of treated and untreated households. Further-
more, the universal nature of the treatment and the participation
rules of the Program generally rule out concern over individual
selection bias that could arise even if program placement were
random. Nonetheless, there is still potential for program timing
bias, in which areas selected for early program participation are in
some way different from the rest. If program timing is not randomly
assigned to neighborhoods conditional on observables, a comparison
of pre- and post-program neighborhoods will produce a biased
estimate of program effect.
The influence of non-random city timing is easily resolved by
including city-fixed effects in the regression estimates.52 A more
complicated source of program timing bias concerns the order in
which project teams entered neighborhoods within cities. Whereas
the available information suggests that program timing was largely
exogenous to the economic environment of neighborhoods,53 without
precise knowledge of the formula for neighborhood timing, I cannot
safely assume random assignment to treatment nor accurately
specify a selection on an observable model. Hence, cautious quasi-
51. See id.; COFOPRI, supra note 32. This region-specific pattern of intervention makes
it important to include city dummies in regression estimates of program effect.
52. The only information on the ordering ofcities comes from a vague statement in World
Bank Project Report, which specifies that the order was designated in advance according to
ease of entry. See Project Appraisal to the Republic of Indonesia for an Urban Poverty Project,
World Bank Doc. 18359-IND (Apr. 4, 1999). As far as neighborhood program timing, there
appears to have been no specific algorithm in the program guidelines. The COFOPRI office
claims that order was only subject to "geographical situation, feasibility to become
regularized, dwellers' requests, existing legal and technical documents, and linkages with
other institutions involved in the existing obstacles." Zoila Z. Yi Yang, COFOPRI, an
Experience of Land Tenure Regularization in Informal Settlements in Peru: Regularization
Process Case Study at the Saul Cantoral Settlement (Advanced Intl Training Programme,
Land Inst. of Tech. School of Architecture, 1999).
53. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 15-17.
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experimental analysis calls for an estimation strategy that is robust
to potential selection on unobservables.
To reduce the role of endogenous program timing, my identifica-
tion strategy makes use of a comparison group of non-beneficiary
households. In a framework analogous to difference-in-difference
(DID) estimation, 4 I compare the difference in labor supply of
potential program beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in
neighborhoods that the Program has reached to the difference in
neighborhoods that have not yet been reached. The simple idea
underlying this distinction is that the tenure security effect of titling
disproportionately, or perhaps solely, benefits households with weak
ex ante property claims for whom the demand for tenure security is
high.55 To capture this, I make use of detailed survey data on past
and present property titles to construct a binary indicator of
whether a household had a title at the start of the titling Program.
Those who do not are labeled "squatters," whereas the term "non-
squatter" refers to households with pre-program titles.
While the behavior of squatters may differ systematically from
that of non-squatters due to any number of unobservable factors,
identification of program effect will be robust as long as it is
constant across program and non-program regions. Appendix 1
provides descriptive statistics on the sample population, 6 allowing
an informal check for random assignment of program timing. As the
means in the table indicate, there is variation in some demographic
characteristics across program and non-program regions. Namely,
sample households in program areas on average have smaller
dwellings (fewer rooms), are more likely to have electricity, and
have higher nativity rates (percentage of members born in the
54. For a useful explanation of the difference-in-difference method of estimation and
others, see Estimation Methods, at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/impact/methods/
estimation.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
55. There were several ways a household might have obtained a property title in the era
before the recent titling effort. First, there was always the lengthy and costly option of
following the official bureaucratic process for obtaining and registering a municipal property
title. Second, there were a handful of past isolated attempts at property reform in which
interim titling agencies were set up by municipal governments in an effort to incorporate
some proportion of informal residents. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE
INviSIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 17-59 (June Abbott trans., 1989). Finally, on a
number of occasions, mayoral and presidential candidates were known to distribute property
titles in an effort to win voter support prior to an election. See Yi Yang, supra note 52, at 4.
56. See infra Appendix 1.
852 [Vol. 45:837
PROPERTY RIGHTS
province). Although statistically significant differences exist across
program and non-program areas, no statistically significant DID is
observed between squatters and non-squatters in program and non-
program areas.57 This finding supports the use of non-squatters as
a comparison group.
To further minimize the potential role of heterogeneity bias, I also
control for a large set of observable household and neighborhood
characteristics in an effort to capture exogenous differences in
household types between program and non-program areas. I also
exploit two sources of predicted variation in the impact of the
treatment on different households types. As implied by the theoreti-
cal model, I expect the impact of receiving a title to be decreasing in
both the number of working-age members and the level of informal
property rights. This allows me to additionally estimate models that
test for predicted heterogeneity in response to the Program
according to household size and residential tenure. Residential
tenure is used as a summary measure of a household's level of
informal property rights. This stems from the assumption that
households with longer community membership can rely more
heavily on community enforcement, documented in studies on
informal property protection.58
Because both household size and residential tenure are highly
correlated with poverty, but in opposite directions, the dual
restriction that program effect be increasing in household size and
decreasing in residential tenure heavily reduces concerns over
program timing bias by eliminating the possible confounding role of
any unobservable trends that are correlated with household
poverty.59 In order for a regional trend in some unobservable
determinant of labor supply to be attributed to the Program
mistakenly, its influence would have to be decreasing in both
residential tenure and household size, and hence no such factor
could be correlated with poverty in either direction.
57. See infra Appendix 1 col.3.
58. See DE SOTO, supra note 55, at 42-51. Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 22, at 999-1001
(2002).
59. Correlations between a three-level poverty index and household size and length of
residence verify these patterns in the COFOPRI baseline survey data. See supra notes 53-59
and accompanying text.
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A. Regression Model
The basic DID estimate of program effect is obtained from the
following ordinary least squares regression:
L = 0 + (N) +62(N) + / 3(squatter) + ,0(program)
+ P5(program*squatter) + a'Xi+ei, (4.1.)
where Li refers to some measure of household time use; N is number
of household members; squatter refers to a household with no
preprogram property title;program indicates whether the household
lives in a neighborhood that has been reached by the Program; and
X, is a vector of demographic controls. The inclusion of controls for
squatter and program fixed effects corresponds to a standard DID
empirical specification. The coefficients of interest are the interac-
tion between the dummy variables for squatter household and
program entry, /5, which can be interpreted as the marginal change
in the dependent variable for the average squatter household
associated with program participation.
In the Table 6 regressions, variation in program response by
residential tenure and household size is captured by the empirical
model:
Li = Po+ P[(N) + P2(N) 2 + [33(squatter) + [ 4(program) + P5(program*squatter) +
P6(programperiods) + P7(program-periods*squatter) + Pg(tenure) +
p,(tenure *squatter) + p ,o(tenure*program) + 11, (tenure*program*squatter) +
P,2(N*squatter)+p13(N*program) + [314(N*squatter)2 + p15(N*program)2 +
3 6(N*program*squatter) + [317(N*program*squatter) 2 + a' Xi+e, (4.1.2)
The variable tenure refers to the number of years a household has
lived in a residence and N is the number of working-age household
members. The quadratic term in family size captures the idea that
leisure hours are likely to be correlated across household members,
such that the likelihood that any household member is at home in
a given moment is increasing with family size at a decreasing rate.
Taking into account all of the relevant interactions, the estimated
average program effect from equation 4.1.2 is [/. + f87(mean #
program periods) + fl31 (mean residential tenure) + /31 (mean house-
hold size) + f 1 (mean household size)2 ].
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The set of regressors contained in X, is common to all regressions
in the empirical section, and includes controls for the number of
working-age household members, city-fixed effects, lot size and
residential tenure, as well as a constant. In addition, X i includes the
following demographic controls: sex, age, education and degree level
of household head; number of household members, number of
school-age children, number of babies (ages 2-4), fraction of adults
that are male, fraction of adults that are immigrants (born outside
of province), and number of members age 70 and older; size of
property, household residential tenure, whether the property has
indoor plumbing, whether the property was acquired by invasion,
and whether the property was inherited; whether the dwelling lies
within walking distance of the nearest primary school, secondary
school, bus stop, public phone, and public market, and this indicator
interacted with walking time to each locale; and whether the
neighborhood has a local bus stop, market, public phone, primary
and secondary school currently and whether each of these existed
two years ago, and whether the neighborhood has a government
school, child, food or general social assistance program. 60
All regressions also include a set of dummy interactions between
cities and program entry, and between cities and pre-program title
status. The inclusion of these interactions absorbs potential regional
variation in program implementation and regional differences in
informal property institutions that could be driving relative
differences in program impact between titled and untitled residents.
It is arguable that the inclusion of such a wide set of demographic
controls amounts to over-controlling. However, the proceeding
results are robust to the exclusion and inclusion of a wide variety of
right-hand-side variables. Finally, all estimates are adjusted to
account for the sample clusters and strata, the standard errors
derived from the Huber-White robust estimator for the variance-
covariance matrix.6 '
60. For precise variable definitions, see infra Appendix 3.
61. For a description of the technique used to estimate standard errors, see ANGUS
DEATON, THE ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS: A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH TO
DEVELOPMENT PoLIcY 66-78 (1997).
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Program Effect on Tenure Security
The first set of empirical results presented in Tables 1-3 concerns
the direct impact of formal property titles on household tenure
security.62 Property formalization will only alter individual and
community time use patterns if becoming a titled property owner
actually changes households' perceived probability of eviction.
Survey data on household perceptions of eviction likelihood and
experiences with receiving a title are therefore informative for
verifying the presumed relationship between title acquisition and
tenure security.
This Article's analysis begins by studying survey responses to the
question: "What do you think are the main benefits of receiving a
property title?" Answers to this question are reported separately for
titled and untitled households in Table 1.6 The pattern of responses
illustrates that, although the primary motivation for land titling
programs is commonly perceived to be improved credit access,64
higher collateral value of land is not the most common benefit
associated with property titles among squatter households. Instead,
75.5% of respondents in titled and 73.9% of respondents in untitled
households cite tenure security as a benefit of obtaining a property
title-roughly twice the number that cite collateral. This evidence
supports the assumption that informal tenure arrangements are not
perfect substitutes for formal property rights in terms of lowering
eviction likelihood in this setting, and hence an important compo-
nent of the cost of informality to households is a reduction in the
perceived risk of losing land.
Table 2 explores the following indicators: whether the household
reported experiencing a change in tenure security with the acquisi-
tion of a property title, and whether eviction is considered "very
likely" or "very unlikely."6" Table 2 presents simple DID estimates
62. See infra Tables 1-3.
63. See infra Table 1.
64. See Joyce Palomar, Land Tenure Security as a Market Stimulator in China, 12 DUKE
J. COMP. & INTL L. 7, 12 n.15 (2002).
65. See infra Table 2.
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based on the methodology described in the previous section.66 In
particular, the difference between early and late program neighbor-
hoods for squatter households are compared to the difference for
households already in possession of a property title prior to the
Program. The means in column 1 indicate that squatters in program
neighborhoods are significantly more likely to report an improve-
ment in tenure security than are titled households.61 Similarly,
columns 2 and 3 reveal that squatters that have participated in the
titling program also report significantly lower current levels of
eviction likelihood than do titled households living in program
neighborhoods.68
In addition to asking respondents whether they experienced a
change in tenure security with titling, the survey also collected
information on the source of the change in tenure security. Table 3
presents tabulations of the responses separately for COFOPRI title-
owners and households that acquired a title prior to the Program.69
Whereas the responses are not well-defined in the sense that they
include such vague answers as "value of a legal document," it is
worth noting that the most common response among those house-
holds that report a positive change in tenure security is that
property titles "give tranquility" or peace of mind and reduce
conflicts over land.
B. Program Effect on Time Spent Inside the Home
To connect the patterns in tenure security with patterns of
household time allocation, I first look in the data for direct evidence
that members of squatter households in program areas are spending
more time at home guarding property. Strong support for this
hypothesis comes from a survey question conveniently included on
the home security module, in which survey respondents were asked
whether their home has a list of security measures, including a
person at home protecting the property. The question does not
collect information on the number of people or amount of time spent
at home, nor does it identify whether individuals are staying home
66. See supra Part III.
67. See infra Table 2 col.1.
68. See infra Table 2 cols.2-3.
69. See infra Table 3.
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for that reason only. Nonetheless, a DID probit analysis of the
binary indicator shows significant differences among squatter
households pre- and post-program, presented in Table 4.70 Results
from these estimates indicate that, in neighborhoods in which the
titling program has entered, pre-program squatters are significantly
less likely to keep a person at home guarding property. Not
surprisingly, given that the variable does not distinguish between
keeping a person at home for several hours a day versus a few hours
a week, this measure depends heavily on the number of household
members. For the average squatter household with four working-
age members and fifteen years of residence, the marginal effect of
two years with a property title is approximately -0.37.71 In other
words, the household is 45% less likely to report keeping a person
at home to guard property. For households with more than four
people, there is no discernable difference, as all of these households
are substantially likely to report having someone at home. 2
A separate outcome related to the time family members spend
inside the home is whether members of a household participate in
market work at home, which is explored in Table 5a.7" In the
sample, 24.3% of households report running a business from home. 4
If in-home work increases tenure security in the absence of a
property title, either by directly protecting the residence or by
facilitating participation in community groups, the marginal value
of in-home work should fall when formal property rights are secured
and there is no longer a security incentive to stay at home. As a
result, newly unconstrained decision makers will have an incentive
to allocate resources more efficiently by moving production outside
of the home or by finding work with an outside employer. The probit
estimates presented in column 1 of Table 5a support these predic-
tions.75 The marginal effect implied by the coefficient on the
70. See infra Table 4. Unlike the simple mean differences presented in Table 3, to obtain
precise estimates of household time-use patterns, the estimates in Table 4 control for
demographic differences between households and regional factors that could confound
measures of program impact.
71. See infra Table 4.
72. See infra Table 4.
73. See infra Table 5a.
74. The exact survey question was: "Do you participate in some economic activity within
your home or use part of your property as a source of economic activity?"
75. See infra Table 5a.
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interaction term between squatter and program periods is an 11.6
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of using the residence
as a source of economic activity for the average squatter household
with two program periods-implying a reduction in the rate of home
business activity of approximately 47%.76
Furthermore, as reported in column 2, a significantly higher
fraction of households in titled neighborhoods are occupied by
individuals who work at home but who say they would prefer to
work outside of the home." From a separate question, the most
common reason for working inside among households in both
program and non-program neighborhoods who would prefer to
relocate is financial constraints. Given that credit constraints are
likely to be even larger among untitled households, it is striking
that a greater fraction of titled households would rather move
business activities outside the home. This suggests that there is
indeed a shift in preferences away from working at home when
households obtain formal property rights.
Consistent with this story is the pattern of tenure security among
home business owners presented in Table 5b.7" Here, the perceived
tenure security of households that use their residence for entrepre-
neurial activities is compared with the security of all other residents
in program and non-program neighborhoods.79 The mean differences
reveal that in titled neighborhoods, tenure security is negatively
correlated with home business activity as economic theory would
predict.80 In contrast, the opposite relationship is observed in
untitled neighborhoods, where home business owners report
significantly lower levels of tenure security than do other
residents. 81
76. See infra Table 5a.
77. See infra Table 5a col.2.
78. See infra Table 5b.
79. See infra Table 5b.
80. See infra Table 5b col.1. In other words, in the absence of a security incentive to stay
home, risk of eviction should reduce the incentive to invest in entrepreneurial activities inside
the home.
81. See infra Table 5b col.2.
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C. Program Effect on Time Outside the Home
The next set of results explores survey data on individual
household members' time use in work and leisure activities outside
the home. Here, the idea is that if lack of a property title leads
household members to spend more time at home, once the titling
program reaches an area, the hours untitled households spend on
activities unrelated to security provision, including employment and
recreational activities, should rise and approach that of titleholders.
1. Labor Supply
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of interest from model
4.1.282 where the dependent variables are total weekly hours of work
per household, fraction of household members in the labor force, and
child labor force participation.83 As described in the previous section,
the estimates in Table 6 allow the program effect to vary by time
elapsed since program entry, length of residence, and family size. In
column 1 of Table 6, the implied marginal effect of residing in a
program neighborhood is a 12.3 hour increase in total household
labor force hours per week. 4 Although the estimated effect on the
average squatter household is insignificant, the estimates indicate
that the size of response depends heavily on household type. For
"new" households and households with few working-age members,
the program effect is relatively large: a squatter household with
three working-age members and only ten years of residential tenure
is predicted to experience a 23.2 hour per week increase in labor
force hours.8 5 Column 2 reveals that added workers account for a
significant portion of the change in family labor supply resulting
82. See supra Part III.A.
83. See infra Table 6. In total, ninety-nine households were dropped from the analysis due
to missing labor supply information (a household was considered to have missing weekly
hours data if it had one or more members who reported having worked the prior week and
who had positive reported values of hours worked per day or days worked per week and
missing values of the other variable), thirty-one households had missing data on property size
and/or local elementary school facilities, twenty households are excluded in two clusters in
which program entry does not match institutional data on regional program timing, and eight
households are excluded because all members are reported as over the age of eighty. These
reductions leave a total of 2592 households.
84. See infra Table 6 col. 1.
85. See infra Table 6 col. 1.
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from the titling program." When the same regressions are run on
household labor force participation rates, we observe an implied 8.3
percentage point increase in the number of working-age household
members who are employed or who are searching for work for
households with three working-age members and ten years of
residential tenure. 7
Column 3 employs the same DID strategy in a probit model where
the dependent variable is a dummy indicator of whether any
household members under age sixteen are reported as working more
than five hours per week.8 As discussed in the previous section, an
increase in formal property rights is predicted to generate a
decrease in the amount of child employment if children have a
comparative advantage in market work relative to home security or
neighborhood property enforcement.8 9 Once again, while the mean
program effect is insignificant, there is a significant effect of
property titling on households with fewer than four working-age
members and few years of residence.' As reported in the last row of
the table, for households with three working-age members, the
implied marginal effect of property titling is large, indicating a
change of 2.6 percentage points in the fraction of children working,
where the mean is 7.8%.91
2. Leisure Activities Outside the Home
While the above results provide strong evidence of a relationship
between formal property titles and labor hours, looking at employ-
ment hours alone gives no direct indication the mechanism by which
an increase in property rights encourages people to work. The model
in Part II predicts this response by assuming that the value of
leisure falls when formal property rights are secured since leisure
86. See infra Table 6 col.2.
87. See infra Table 6 col.2.
88. See infra Table 6.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. I estimate a binary model rather than
modeling the marginal effect on child labor hours due to the fact that the majority of families
report no child labor hours, necessitating a limited dependent variable model with more
stringent functional form assumptions.
90. See infra Table 6 col.3.
91. See infra Table 6 col.3.
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hours can contribute to informal tenure security.9 2 An important
piece of supporting evidence for this hypothesis comes from studying
data on household members' monthly participation in organized
activities outside the home. Just as with labor supply, if staying at
home increases tenure security, members' participation in leisure
activities should also be hindered by an unwillingness to leave the
home.
Information on non-work activities outside the home comes from
a survey question regarding all household members' participation
in "groups, organizations or associations" that include the following:
women's groups, political groups, youth groups, religious organiza-
tions, sports, financial groups, unions, craft or producers' organiza-
tions, and cultural associations: Although these activities do not
encompass all potential leisure activities outside the home, a
separate survey question asked only for the respondent to indicate
whether most other free time is spent inside the home.9" According
to these data, 87.8% of respondents' leisure hours are spent inside
the home. The four most common activities are resting, read-
ing/watching television/listening to music, doing household chores,
and spending time with family. The most common outdoor leisure
activities from these data are religious activities and sports, which
account for 86% of outside "free time hours."94 Both of these
activities are included in the Table 7 data on time in groups. 95
The DID estimates presented in Table 7 reveal that squatters'
time spent participating in outside leisure activities also increases
with program participation, demonstrating that members of
squatter households in program areas are not only working
significantly more hours, but also are spending more leisure time
outside of the home post-program. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that
both the probability of participation in any outside leisure activity
and the number of days per month of participation rise significantly
92. See supra Part II.
93. In particular, respondents in all households were asked whether they have free time,
how many hours per week, and how they spend it. For tabulation of survey question, see infra
Table 7. Unfortunately, these data are not useful in exploring the program effect on leisure
hours without strong assumptions regarding the selection of respondents across program and
non-program neighborhoods.
94. See infra Table 7.
95. See infra Table 7 cols.3, 6.
96. See infra Table 7.
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for squatters in program neighborhoods, such that newly titled
households spend almost twice as much time outside the home in
these activities.9" This result is particularly surprising given that
total leisure hours decrease when households enter the titling
program. The result, therefore, provides additional support for the
hypothesis that untitled households are constrained in their ability
to participate in all activities outside the home. The results in Table
7 indicate that the labor supply response to obtaining a property
title is not driven by a lower demand for outside leisure activities
associated with receiving a property title.9"
Columns 3 and 4 divide reported time spent in outside organiza-
tions into participation in "neighborhood groups" and all other
organizations." In the survey, neighborhood groups were defined as
those in which "neighbors come together to complete a project that
would benefit all members of the community or to resolve a problem
that is affecting everyone." Unlike other activities in the data,
because these organizations frequently are responsible for land-
related projects and neighborhood security, I expect the change in
household participation in neighborhood groups to be lower among
titled households. Indeed, columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 reveal that the
entire program effect on time allocated to outside activities is
concentrated among activities other than public goods provision
through neighborhood groups."° Column 7 indicates that the
estimated change in days per month in neighborhood groups among
those households that do participate in some activity outside the
home is negative and significant. 10 1 This pattern is consistent with
a scenario in which newly titled households are substituting non-
work hours in neighborhood public projects for time spent in private
organizations and activities when they attain greater formal
property protection. This would arise if incorporation into the formal
property system provides households with greater access to state-
provided public goods, including property rights enforcement.
It is also interesting to note from Table 7 that not only does
participation in property-related neighborhood groups fall with
97. See infra Table 7 cols.1-2.
98. See infra Table 9.
99. See infra Table 9 cols.3-4.
100. See infra Table 7.
101. See infra Table 8 col.7.
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titling, but so does participation in infrastructure-related neighbor-
hood groups. Since there are no significant differences in the level
of public service provision in program and non-program areas, this
does not appear to be driven by a shift in supply. A more likely
explanation is that investment in community infrastructure serves
to increase community tenure rights in informal neighborhoods, so
demand for these investments falls with formalization whereas
demand for investment in individual housing units rises.
D. Community-Level Evidence
The last set of results examines the trend in property-related
neighborhood and state-level governance across program and non-
program areas.0 2 As documented in de Soto's ground-breaking work
on urban informality in Peru, property protection in squatter
communities frequently involves neighborhood-level governance.'13
The level of land-related governance presumably should fall when
these communities are incorporated into the formal property
system.
1. Neighborhood Organizations
The first consideration is the differences between program and
non-program neighborhoods in the existence of any type of local
public goods provision. These data come from a survey question in
which respondents were asked: "In your community, have neighbors
come together to complete a project that would benefit all members
of the community or to resolve a problem that is affecting everyone,"
irrespective of whether individual household members participate
in such projects.'0" Households that responded positively were asked
to describe up to two types of neighborhood organizations that are
present in the community.' Households with COFOPRI titles were
also asked about the existence and nature of neighborhood organiza-
102. See infra Table 8.
103. See DE SOTO, supra note 55, at 19-29, 35-55.
104. See infra Table 8.
105. See infra Table 8.
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tions before the titling program."°6 Table 8 presents the means from
these data separately for program and non-program neighbor-
hoods' revealing that program areas are significantly less likely to
have any type of neighborhood organization than were non-program
areas at the time of the survey. The last two rows of the table
present means for the two most common types of local group: land
and property governance-including reallocation of land, neighbor-
hood security and (informal) titling-and projects related to public
utilities and infrastructure provision."8 Here we see a dramatic
difference in the presence of titling and land allocation-related
organizations, as well as significantly fewer infrastructure-related
neighborhood groups. These data provide evidence that land
formalization indeed shifts key institutional responsibilities away
from local communities as well as local households.
This pattern is hardly surprising given the results of Table 7,
which indicate that land titling is associated with fewer household
participation hours in neighborhood groups.' °9 More striking is the
fact that early and late program neighborhoods report an approxi-
mately identical frequency of neighborhood organizations before the
program, as evidenced by a comparison of column 1 and column 3 in
Table 8.110 This pattern strengthens support for a causal interpreta-
tion of land titling and neighborhood public goods provision.
2. Law Enforcement
The evidence from individual labor and community organization
hours suggests that time-use patterns change in response to
heightened residential security. If the driving force behind this
behavioral response to land titling is indeed that the role of property
protection is shifted from individual household members to the
state, we would expect a corresponding change in the presence and
activities of law enforcement agencies in local communities. In other
106. See infra Table 8.
107. See infra Table 8.
108. See infra Table 8.
109. See infra Table 7.
110. See infra Table 8 cols.1, 3.
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words, if there is no increased property protection by government
agencies, there is no reason for households and communities to feel
more comfortable abandoning this role."'
Unfortunately, the only information on the role of legal and
judicial institutions comes from a survey question regarding
household experiences with various state institutions, including the
police force and judicial system."' In particular, respondents were
asked whether they have utilized the services of either institution,
and then asked to rank the quality of the service on a scale from one
to five, where five is "very good" and one is "very bad.""' Table 9
presents the coefficient estimate on the indicator of residing in a
program neighborhood from probit and regression estimates of these
outcomes." 4 The estimates reported in columns 1 and 3 reveal no
difference in the use or quality of police services. "' While this is
somewhat surprising given that individual property rights of titled
households are presumably enforced by local police, it is important
to keep in mind that the available data do not provide information
on the level of police presence in the neighborhood, which could be
sufficient to deter actual police interventions. Likewise, the
expectations of police enforcement of formal property rights could be
sufficient to deter the number of property-related crimes and
thereby reduce the demand for police services.
In contrast, the probit estimate of column 2 indicates that
households in titled neighborhoods have a significantly higher
likelihood of going to court, although the difference across titled and
untitled neighborhoods in the quality of judicial services is again
close to zero and insignificant."6 While the reason for judicial
intervention is unobservable, the pattern is consistent with
increased access to legal resources among property owners and a
111. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that households in titled neighborhoods do in
fact report a higher perceived level of tenure security, as indicated by the estimates in Table
2, infra. Even if actual security does not change, the difference in expectations is sufficient
to influence their behavior in the short run.
112. See infra Table 9.
113. For results, see infra Table 9 col.3.
114. See infra Table 9.
115. See infra Table 9 cols.1, 3.
116. See infra Table 9 col.2.
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corresponding reduction in the demand for informal property
protection.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, a handful of policy initiatives have arisen to
address tenure insecurity of untitled residents by promoting formal
property institutions in urban slums of several developing
countries.11 7 Obtaining accurate measures of the microeconomic
impact of titling programs is especially important at this juncture,
given the resources devoted to such reforms. While cost-benefit
analyses suggest that governments are more efficient suppliers of
property rights, these claims tend to ignore actual quantifications
of the immediate cost to households of individual property protec-
tion. Accurately measuring the return to property formalization
requires adequate attention to the cost of informality, including the
time allocated to informal property protection at both the household
and the community level.
By studying the relationship between exogenous acquisition of
land title and household time allocation inside and outside the
home, this Article has provided new evidence on the value of formal
property institutions to urban squatters in developing countries.
This Article's results indicate that urban land titling efforts lead to
substantial changes in the pattern of time allocated to guarding
property or participating in neighborhood groups by previously
untitled households. Individuals in titled households spend fewer
hours inside the home guarding property and engaging in home-
based entrepreneurial activities, and a greater number of hours in
both employment and private leisure activities outside the home.
Furthermore, participation in informal neighborhood projects falls,
whereas household experiences with formal government agencies
rises in titled communities. These results provide empirical support
for the anecdotal evidence that untitled squatters commonly attain
informal rights by taking time off from work to participate in such
activities as guarding their property, participating in community
117. See World Bank Briefing Note, Land, Security, Property Rights and the Urban Poor:
Twenty Five Years of World Bank Experience 8 (2001) for an overview.
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groups, and filing administrative claims for formalization. As
indicated by these results, critical components of the cost of
informality, and hence important indicators of the value of urban
property institutions in a given setting, are the time costs and
distortions in optimal time allocation that result from informal
tenure arrangements.
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Table 1: What Do You Think Are the Main Benefits of a Property Title?
Untitled Titled
(N=1064) (N=1674)
Tenure security 75.53 73.92
Collateral 37.54 39.68
Access to public utilities 2.81 3.35
Other 1.67 2.44
None 0.38 1.46
Note: Multiple responses allowed.
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Table 2: Perceived Tenure Security, Difference in Difference Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Improvement in tenure Do you consider dwelling Do you consider dwelling
security with last title? currently at risk of currently very secure from
eviction/invasion? eviction/invasion?
Pre-program Pre-program Pre-program Pre-program Pre-program Pre-program
squatter titled squatter titled squatter titled
(N=559) (N=1921) (N=559) (N=1921) (N=559) (N=1921)
No titling program 0.000 0.586 0.433 0.181 0.148 0.333
(0.000) (0.012) (0.023) (0.011) (0.026) (0.012)
Titling program 0.674 0.657 0.157 0.093 0.379 0.377
(0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.030) (0.020)
Difference 0.674 0.071 -0.276 -0.088 0.232 0.044
(0.037) (0.023) (0.030) (0.017) (0.040) (0.024)
Difference in difference 0.603** -0.188** 0.188**
(0.045) (0.035) (0.046)
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Only eligible households (according to
residential tenure) included. Change in tenure security comes from survey
question: "Did the last property document you obtained affect the security of your
residence?" asked only of households with property documents. Other data based
on responses to survey question: "How secure do you consider your property?"
Respondents could report: (1) Very secure, I do not believe that it will be taken; (2)
Secure; (3) Not so secure, I believe that in any moment it could be taken; (4) Not
at all secure, I believe that it is very probable that at some moment it will be
taken. Households were classified as "at risk" if they answered (3) or (4).
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Table 3: WhyDid a Property Title Improve the Security of Your Residence?
COFOPRI Other title
(N= 569) (N= 1271)
Gives tranquility/reduces conflict 37.57 47.80
Value of legal document 27.01 21.82
Access to credit 8.23 4.07
Provides guarantee 5.19 2.61
Better to have more than one document 0.18 0.00
Allows me to make housing improvements 0.00 0.16
No improvement 21.82 23.53
Why not?
Already secure 12.88 8.14
Debt 2.33 5.86
Property in insecure neighborhood 0.54 2.12
Institution not effective 0.18 1.06
Process incomplete 0.36 0.00
Wrong type of title 0.36 0.33
Other 5.19 6.02
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Table 4: Whether Household Member Stays Home for Security
(N=2368)
Number of working-age
members
Squatter*program
Squatter*program periods
Squatter*program*tenure
Squatter*program*working-age
members
(Squatter*program*working-age
members) 2
Implied program effect: t N=4,
T= 15
0.041
(0.06)
-0.514
(0.62)
-0.562
(0.161)**
0.011
(0.02)
0.429
(0.177)**
-0.038
(0.018)**
-0.365
(0.176)**
** Significant at the .01% level.
t Implied program effect was evaluated at N number of working-age household
members, T years of residential tenure and median number of program periods (2).
Notes: Probit estimate, marginal effects were reported. Dependent variable is
dummy indicator of whether household reported that one or more members stay
home to provide security. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regression includes
controls for city, size of property, residential tenure, household composition,
number of rooms in dwelling, number of floors in dwelling, whether home business
is in residence, and age and sex of household. Robust standard errors account for
sample clustering and stratification. Only eligible households (residential tenure
pre-1995) are included.
---- -------------- ------ ---- --- -- -6 - -- -- --- --- -- - -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -
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Table 5a: Economic Activity in Residence
(1) (2)
(N=2297) (N=592)
Econonic acl&ity in residence Would prefer to work outside
of home
Squatter 0.008 0.458
(0.093) (0. 184)**
Program 0.176 -0.041
(0.107) (0.154)
Squatter*program periods -0.182 0.452
(0.091)* (0.293)**
Inplied marginal change -0.116 -0.177
* Significant at the 0.01% level.
** Significant at the 0.05% level.
Notes: Binomial probit estimates, standard errors are in parentheses. All
regressions control for city, size of property and residential tenure of household.
Robust standard errors account for sample clustering and stratification. Ineligible
households (residential tenure pre-1995) and households with missing values for
working members are excluded. Demographic controls include: sex and age of
household head; of members of school-age children, of babies, percentage male and
percentage immigrants; whether indoor plumbing, whether property acquired by
invasion and whether inherited lot; and whether neighborhood has municipal
services, electrical infrastructure, whether local bus stop/market/commissary/
primary and secondary school two years ago, whether neighborhood has school
assistance program, cluster average walking distance to local primary school, and
cluster average walking distance to bus stop.
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Table 5b: Do You Consider Dwelling Currently Very Secure from Eviction/
Invasion?
(1) (2)
(N=1616) (N=837)
Program No Program
Economic Activity in Residence 0.719 0.329
(0.063) (0.055)
No Economic Activity in Residence 0.599 0.303
(0.041) (0.073)
Difference -0.120 -0.026
(0.040) (0.024)
Difference in Difference 0.094
(0.036)**
** Significant at the 0.05% level.
Notes: Regression-controlled means, standard errors are in parentheses. Robust
standard errors account for sample clustering and stratification. Ineligible
households (residential tenure pre-1995) and households with missing values for
working members are excluded. All regressions control for city, size ofproperty, sex
of household head, literacy and education level of household head, number of
working-age members, and number of babies age 2-4.
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Table 6: Household Labor Supply, Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Household Weekly
(N=2379) Hours in Labor Force
Number of working-age
members
Squatter*program
Squatter*program periods
Squatter*program*tenure
Squatter*program*working-
age members
(Squatter*program*working-
age members)
2
9.25
(6.45)
58.33
(26.04)*
16.4
(5.37)**
-1.12
(0.56)*
-29.09
(I 1.66)*
3.39
(1.3 1)*
Fraction of Household
Members in Labor Force
-0.095
(0.018)**
0.207
(0.156)
0.058
(0.020)**
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.112
(0.060)
0.011
(0.005)*
Implied program effect: t 12.27 0.046 -0.713
N=4, T=15 (7.98) (0.029) (0.370)
(Marginal effect) 0.24
Implied program effect: 23.23 0.083 -0.823
N=3, T=10 (7.97)** (0.038)* (0.401)*
(Marginal effect) 0.26
t Implied program effect was effect evaluated at N number of working-age
household members, T years of residential tenure and median number of program
periods (2).
* Significant at the 0.05% level.
** Significant at the 0.01% level.
Notes: Columns 1-2 are OLS regressions. Column 3 is binomial probit estimation
where dependent variable is dummy indicator ofwhether household members ages
5-16 report working more than 5 hours/week. Standard errors are in parentheses.
All regressions control for city, size of property and residential tenure of household.
In addition, estimates include all relevant intermediate interactions of household
tenure and size. Robust standard errors account for sample clustering and
stratification. Ineligible households (residential tenure pre-1995) and households
with missing hours or days values for working members are excluded.
20041
Child Labor Force
Participation
0.282
(0.111)*
-4.475
(1.680)**
0.471
(0.323)
0.012
(0.028)
1.119
(0.542)*
-0.085
(0.047)
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Demographic controls include: sex, age, literacy and degree level of household
head; number of members, number of school-age children, number of babies,
fraction male, fraction immigrants, and number of members 70 and older; whether
there is indoor plumbing, whether property acquired by invasion, and whether
inherited lot; whether dwelling lies within walking distance and this indicator
interacted with walking time to nearest primary school, secondary school, bus stop,
public phone, and public market; and whether neighborhood has local bus stop,
market, public phone, primary and secondary school currently and for last two
years, and whether neighborhood has school, child, food or social assistance
program.
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Table 7: Household Participation in Outside Activities
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
111 days per 104 days pei month HI days per
HH patcipation 1.3 days per mo-h in HH days per HH days pei in neighborhood month in other
inoutside month of neighborhad mmthinolher mmh givn groups given activities given
activities participation groups aivities paticipation fmsticipati n participation
OlN2314) (O42314) (N-2314) (N-2314) (V."47) (N.447) (N.447)
Number of working. 0.000 0.153 0.001 0.152 1.00 1.00 0.005
age members (0.013) (0.116) (0.006) (0.111) (0.33) (0.33)-- (0.014)**
Squaer 0.022 0.042 4.038 0.081 4.23 4.59 0.353
(0.028) (0.195) (0.0) (0.169). (I.14)- (I.12)* (0.053)
Progran area 0.024 0.384 4.001 0.386 .10.06 -11.00 0.932
(0.061) (0.439) (0.028) (0.425) (1.64)-- (1.73)-- (0.159)*
Squaer*progimm 0.063 0.543 0.022 021 4,12 4.25 -0.136
(0.016)** (0.164) (0.019) (0.178)-- (0.84)-- (0.86)-- (0.066)**
* Significant at the 0.01% level.
** Significant at the 0.05% level.
Notes: Column 1 is probit estimate and columns 2-7 are OLS regressions, standard
errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors account for sample clustering
and stratification. Only eligible households (residential tenure pre-1995) are
included. Control variables in each estimate correspond to set ofregressors in notes
to Table 6.
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Table 8: Neighborhood Organizations, Sample Means
(1) (2) (3)
Non-program Program Program area
area area ta pre-program
(N=1799) (N=939) (N=572)
Whether neighborhood has organizationt  0.599 0.423 8.68 0.602
Tve of organization
Infrastructure (roads/parks/electricity/water) 0.471 0.345 6.30 0.470
Titlingland allocation/property security 0.191 0.088 7.00 0.176
sports 0.028 0.020 1.30 0.027
t Data comes from survey question: "In your neighborhood, have neighbors come
together to complete a project that would benefit all members of the community,
or to resolve a problem that is affecting everyone? If yes, what type?" Only
households with COFOPRI titles were asked about the existence of community
organizations both before and after the titling program. Hence, the responses in
column 3 came from titled households only.
Note: Respondents could report one or two types of community organizations.
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Table 9: Relationship with Law Enforcement Agencies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(N=2382) (demographic characteristics, city*prograna years, and city*initial rights)
Had Experience Had Experience Quality of
Using Police with Judicial Quality of Experience Experience with
Services System with Police Judicial System
Program neighborhood 0.098 0.300 -0.107 -0.032
(0.082) (0.092)* (0.183) (0.169)
Implied marginal change 0.038 0.085
* Significant at the 0.05% level.
** Significant at the 0.01% level.
Notes: Columns 1-2 are binomial probit estimates, columns 3-4 are OLS
regressions where dependent variables are 5-level index of quality of services.
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for city, size of property and
residential tenure of household, and columns 3-4 include all relevant intermediate
interactions of household tenure and size. Robust standard errors account for
sample clustering and stratification. Ineligible households (residential tenure
pre-1995) and households with missing values for working members are excluded.
Demographic controls include: sex and age of household head; number of
members, number of school-age children, number of babies, percentage male and
percentage immigrants; whether there is indoor plumbing, whether property
acquired by invasion and whether inherited lot; and whether neighborhood has
municipal services, electrical infrastructure, whether local bus stop, market,
commissary, primary and secondary school two years ago, whether neighborhood
has school assistance program, cluster average walking distance to local primary
school, and cluster average walking distance to bus stop.
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Appendix 1. Sample Means
Pre-program squatter households Pre-proram titled households
(N=668) (N=2082)
(la) (Ib) (lc) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3)
Program No Program ItjI Program No Program IAt ItA2I
Female head of HH 0.232
Age of HH head 46.79
HH size (# members) 5.059
Number of rooms in 3.19
dwelling
Lot size (m2) 170.6
Highest grade head 4.633
Residence acquired by 0.27
invasion
Age of dwelling 17.5
HH adult literacy rate 0.854
Plumbing 0.734
Light 0.948
Municipal service 0.792
(water)
HH monthly expend. 558.7
(S/)
Whether HH saves 0.08
Number of members 1.453
moved/left HH
Number of members 7.053
born in province
0.259
47.63
5.178
3.527
210.0
4.716
0.202
17.71
0.861
0.653
0.893
0.814
0.223
50.49
5.368
3.74
197.7
4.77
0.22
21
0.877
0.839
0.978
0.892
0.247 1.13 0.09
50.78 0.29 0.37
5.603 1.87 0.56
3.982 2.32 0.61
208.5 0.59 0.9
4.646 1.45 1.39
0.213 0.2 1.08
19.12 1.8 1.48
0.867 1.2 1.08
0.829 0.28 1.35
0.944 2.81 0.83
0.898 0.18 0.33
544.8 0.52 587.6 567.4 0.86 0.19
0.068 0.54 0.075 0.095 1.3 1.24
1.325 0.65 1.709 1.609 0.71 0.12
7.395 2.02 6.571 6.661 0.05 1.67
880
Notes: Columns 1c and 2c report the t-statistics of the difference between columns
la and 1b, and 2a and 2b. Column 3 reports the t-statistic of the difference in
difference.
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Appendix 2: Map of Untitled Properties and Program
Areas
NUMBER OF UNTITLED PROPERTIES
(NATIONAL LEVEL)
Titles
[ZJ 5000 - 20000
[j 20000 - 40000
--- 40000 - 65000
65000 - 100000
100000 - 130000
130000 -500000
Source: ENAHO TRIMESTER II, 1998
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PROGRAM UNIVERSE OF INFORMAL PROPERTY AND
LEVEL OF FORMALIZATION VIA COFOPRI
PIURA
CHIC LAYO
CHIMBOTE
LIMA
NUMBER OF TITLES EQUIPA
Universe of Informal Property
COFOPRI Titles
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Appendix 3: Definitions of Variables
BABIES: Number of household members age 2-4.
EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD: Four dummies
indicating whether or not household head completed primary
school, high school (common or technical), non-university post-
secondary, and university education.
FIRST OWNERS OF DWELLING: Household members built
or were first to reside in dwelling.
INHERIT: From question, "How did you obtain this property?"
respondent answered, "By inheritance."
INVADED PROPERTY: From question, "How did you obtain
this property?" respondent answered, "By invasion."
INVADED DWELLING: From question, "What type of
ownership claim does the household have with respect to the
dwelling?" respondent answered, "Invaded or de facto."
LITERACY OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD: Household head can
read and write.
LOT SIZE: Property size in square meters. Interviewers
instructed to verify if possible size recorded on property
deed/title.
MARITAL STATUS OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD: Dummy
indicator of whether or not household head reports either being
married or having a domestic partner.
MEMBERS: Total number of people who "habitually live and
share meals" in the household.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM:
Someone in cluster reports participating in or benefitting from
a family planning program.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS CHILD WELFARE PROGRAM:
Someone in cluster reports participating in or benefitting from
Vaso de Leche, Wawa Wasi, PRONEI, or public day care
program.
8832004]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM:
Someone in cluster reports participating in or benefitting
from school lunch, community kitchen, PANFAR, food-for-work,
church kitchen, or food donation program.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS SCHOOL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM: Someone in cluster reports participating in or ben-
efitting from a literacy program, school insurance program, or
INFES.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS GENERAL SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM: Someone in cluster reports participating in or
benefitting from FONCODES, VAN, or other type of assistance
program.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS [ FACILITY: Anyone in cluster unit
reports that neighborhood currently has primary school/sec-
ondary school/job training center/bank/paved road/bus stop/
soccer field/public phone/post office/market/commissary/ cinema/
health center reasonably in reach.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAD [ I TWO YEARS AGO: Anyone in
cluster unit reports that neighborhood had current nearest []
facility for at least two years.
NEIGHBORHOOD WALKING INDICATOR TO [ ]: Whether
or not anyone in neighborhood reports walking to [ I facility.
NEIGHBORHOOD AVERAGE WALKING DISTANCE TO
[ 1: The mean commuting time to [ among people in cluster who
claim to walk there.
NEIGHBORHOOD LACKS INFRASTRUCTURE: From
question, "Which services does community lack" Answer: "Public
infrastructure (roads/bridges)."
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS NO MUNICIPAL SERVICES: How
does household generally dispose of trash? Municipal trash
services. Year of municipal service? Pre-1995.
NEIGHBORHOOD HAS NO PUBLIC WATER SYSTEM:
From question, "Which services does community lack?" Answer:
"Public water system."
PERCENT IMMIGRANTS: Percentage of household members
who report being born in the province.
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PERCENT MALE: Percentage of household members age 5-70
(working-age) who are male.
[INDOOR] PLUMBING: From question, "Where does this
household get water?" Answer: "Faucet inside home." From
which year public system? Before 1995.
PROGRAM: More than one household in cluster reports having
a COFOPRI title.
PROGRAM PERIODS: One of four program periods
determined by cluster year of program entry. Year of entry
defined as the cluster minimum year of COFOPRI title greater
than 1992. If minimum year less than 1992, second minimum
year is used. Lengths of program periods described in Section
4.2.
SCHOOL-AGE KIDS: Number of children ages 5-10 (primary
school age).
SENIORS: Number of household members over age 70.
SHOCK: Household reports experiencing economic shock
unrelated to titling program during past year.
SQUATTER: A household is identified from my data as a
squatter household in the following manner:
Treatment Group:
"squatter"=1 if:
(1) current squatter, identified by (a) "title type"= "No title";
or (b) "title type"= "Other documents" and "registered"=
"no"; or (c) "title type"= "Legal settlement" and
"registered"= "no", OR
(2) pre-program squatter, identified by "title type"=
"COFOPRI", and (a) "old title type"= "No title" or (b) "old
title type"= "Other documents" and "previously
registered"= "no" or (c) "old title type"= "Legal settlement"
and "previously registered"= "no"
Control Group:
"squatter"=0 if:
(1) current titleowner in non-program area, OR
(2) pre-program titleowner in program area
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TENURE: Residential tenure is defined as the earliest year in
which a resident reports having lived in the house. Data comes
from information collected on each household member, including
which year they moved (or were born) into the house.
WALKING INDICATOR TO [ I FACILITY: Whether or not
household reaches [ I facility by walking.
WALKING DISTANCE TO [ I FACILITY: Household walking
time to reach [ ] facility.
WORKING-AGE MEMBERS: Number of household members
between ages 5 and 70.
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Appendix 4: Legislative Guidelines for Peruvian Urban
Property Reforms
Legislative Decree No. 803: Law To Promote Access to Formal
Property
Supreme Decree No. 009-99-MTC: Approves the unique text in the
Law to Promote Access to Formal Property
Supreme Decree No. 014-98-MTC: Approves the establishment of
the Commission for Formalizing Informal Property (COFOPRI)
Resolution No. 261-97-MTC-15.01: Approves the organizational
rules and functions of COFOPRI
Supreme Decree No. 020-99-MTC: Approves the legislation gov-
erning administrative processes under COFOPRI
